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Abstract
The 1996 federal welfare-to-work legislation generated significant debate regarding 
what role public transportation should play in facilitating lower welfare rates.  Given 
this debate, transportation has been called the “to” component of welfare-to-work. 
In this paper, we present findings from three case studies that examine job accessibil-
ity and reverse commute transportation programs in the Chicago, Kansas City, and 
San Francisco metropolitan regions.  We explored how institutional and/or grassroots 
support prevented or fostered the innovation and implementation of non-traditional 
Access-to-Jobs and Reverse Commute (JARC) programs.  Our findings suggest that 
institutional support and grassroots support are necessary ingredients for the imple-
mentation of innovative transportation programs for low-income families. 
Introduction
In 1996, Congress passed a sweeping welfare reform law called the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which 
replaced the existing welfare entitlement program.  One aspect of PRWORA that 
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has impacted urban and rural transportation services was the requirement that 
welfare recipients find full-time employment.  Congress recognized that the poor 
faced a major spatial mismatch in terms of where they lived (typically, central cit-
ies) and where new employment opportunities were located (generally, the outer 
suburbs) (Kasarda 1988; Gomez Ibanez 1984; Sanchez et al. 2003).  The spatial 
mismatch makes commuting to suburban job centers difficult (to say nothing of 
finding a new job in the first place), but particularly challenging for workers (or 
potential workers) who do not have access to a car.  One of the major obstacles 
welfare mothers faced as they tried to find work was an insufficient transportation 
infrastructure to overcome the spatial mismatch (Blumenberg 2002; Blumenberg 
and Manville 2004; Cervero 2004; Ortoleva and Brenman 2004; Sanchez et al. 
2004).  In response to inadequate transit access and service, several policy pro-
grams were designed to provide and fund reliable transportation for low-income 
families.1 The underlying goal for all these programs was to provide flexible trans-
portation to increase economic opportunity.  The primary funds for transporta-
tion services for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) recipients came 
from TANF (user-side subsidies), Welfare-to-Work Grants (Department of Labor), 
and Bridges-to-Work (Blumenberg 2002; Government Accounting Office 1998). 
However, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) proposed the creation 
of a much larger $600 million Access-to-Jobs program to be administered by the 
Federal Transit Administration (FTA) (Government Accounting Office 1998).  The 
Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) established the Access-
to-Jobs and Reverse Commute (JARC) program in 1998 and authorized up to $750 
million over five years to implement the program.    
One important aspect of the JARC program was that TEA-21 limited funding of 
Access-to-Jobs programs to 50 percent of each grantee’s project, unlike the 80 
percent match generally available for highway projects and New Start transit proj-
ects (Government Accounting Office 1998).  The policy incentive was designed to 
encourage local, regional, and state agencies to collaborate with each other as they 
designed transportation policies.  Another important aspect of the policy was that 
JARC was designed to be a competitive granting process.  The rationale behind this 
aspect of the program was to fund the most innovative and effective transporta-
tion programs for low-income families.  Policy makers conceded that “existing 
public transportation systems cannot always bridge the gap between where the 
poor live and where jobs are located” (Government Accounting Office 1998).  The 
policy incentive strongly encouraged traditional transportation agencies to work 
with local grassroots organizations in an effort to explore all non-traditional trans-
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portation alternatives to the fixed route or existing mass transit systems (Govern-
ment Accounting Office 1998). 
There is no question that the JARC programs distributed a large sum of transporta-
tion funding targeted towards low-income populations.  However, it is not clear if 
this funding was effective in allowing individuals to move into the workforce, par-
ticularly since the evaluations conducted by the Government Accounting Office 
(GAO) focused more on the process of awarding JARC funds rather than program 
outcomes.  Moreover, the lasting impact of the JARC funds is not clear.  While 
there was hope that JARC funds would serve as seed money to get deserving proj-
ects off the ground, program implementers seemed to accept that many projects 
were experimental and would not be made permanent.  This raises a legitimate 
point about the long-term sustainability of JARC programs.
The critics of JARC were right to ask whether JARC programs were merely a 
cosmetic policy remedy or if the programs truly were designed to eliminate the 
deep structural inequalities built into the existing mass transportation systems.  If 
the primary goal was the elimination or at least reduction of structural inequal-
ity, then phasing out federal funding sent the wrong message, unless one truly 
believed that, with one major push, people would leave and remain off of welfare. 
In reality, few metropolitan regions have the fiscal resources to maintain these 
programs without additional federal support.  Pittsburgh is only one of many cases 
where budgetary crises have led to the proposed elimination of JARC programs 
(Curry 2007).  
An equally important dueling tension emerges as to whether JARC is a transpor-
tation program or employment program (Wachs and Taylor 1998).  If JARC is 
viewed as a transportation program, the goals and objectives will obviously be dif-
ferent compared to designing programs, goals, and objectives as an employment 
program, which would also translate into evaluation criteria (i.e., focusing on the 
number of people who can remain off welfare due to using the services and not 
narrow fiscal questions about ridership recovery ratios [Petersen and Sermons 
1996]).  This dueling tension was and is a reality in many regions.  Without reliable 
transportation access, many low-income families simply cannot maintain stable 
employment.  Thus, innovative transportation programs not only provide reliable 
transportation services, but also are the umbilical cord to economic mobility for 
many low-income families.  
In this study, the objective was to examine how grassroots and institutional sup-
port shaped regional JARC transportation policies.  Of special interest was how 
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these processes of support shaped innovation and implementation of transpor-
tation policies within the Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs).  To the 
extent that MPOs design new transportation policies with the support of the 
institutional and grassroots organizations, there will be prima facie evidence that 
both types of support are necessary to creatively develop and implement trans-
portation policies for low-income populations. 
Background 
This study follows the lead of Blumenberg, Cervero, Sanchez, and Schweitzer, who 
paved a path for scholars to study the effectiveness of transportation programs 
to provide reliable private mobility and economic opportunity (Blumenberg et 
al. 2003; Cervero et al. 2002; Sanchez and Schweitzer 2008; Blumenberg and Sch-
weitzer 2006).  This literature is followed in drawing on three key themes to frame 
the inquiry: (1) innovation with JARC programs; (2) devolution of authority and 
decision making to grassroots organizations; and (3) inter-agency collaboration 
(i.e., institutional support).  
First, there is an ongoing debate if federal money should be used to buy cars for 
low-income families.  The assumption prior to the 1996 welfare-to-work law was 
that federal money should be used for public transportation.  Welfare bureaucrats 
were working with a similar assumption.  For example, welfare families were sanc-
tioned off of welfare if they owned a car worth more than $1,500 because it was 
deemed an asset (Ong 1996).  However, a tremendous amount of research shows 
the advantages of mobility by car versus public transportation for welfare recipi-
ents (Cervero and Tsai 2003; Ong 1996; Ong and Blumenberg 1998; O'Regan and 
Quigley 1998; Raphael and Rice 2002).    
Second, building on the theme of collaborative policy design, the federal govern-
ment encouraged non-traditional transportation providers to submit applications 
for JARC funding.  However, several scholars have pointed out that this process 
of devolution had the potential to lead to a “race to the bottom,” where non-
traditional transportation providers would compete with each other in cutting 
costs and ultimately services (Lieberman and Shaw 2000; Schram 1998).  The more 
important aspect of the devolution policy incentive was the real possibility that 
the large traditional transportation agencies would give meaningful authority and 
power to non-traditional transportation providers (i.e., grassroots organizations). 
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Finally, in a post welfare-to-work era, working on a transportation problem alone 
was not looked on favorably.  To receive the new federal funds, Congress required 
transportation agencies to collaborate with each other to prevent duplication of 
services, capitalize on the strengths of each agency, and build on the collective 
strengths of the new partnerships.  This new policy incentive assumed that agen-
cies had similar goals and objectives.  In addition to typical bureaucratic turf wars, 
the reality is that there were and are different visions regarding the goals, objec-
tives, and definitions of success for JARC programs, which greatly complicates co-
ordination between agencies; therefore, impacting the magnitude of institutional 
support for any given JARC program (Blumenberg 2002).
Theoretical Framework
This study of implementing JARC by MPOs could be grounded in a variety of 
theoretical perspectives, including rational choice theory, functional theory, or 
collective rationality theory (Douglas 1986).2 We believe collective rationality 
theory is the most appropriate framework to compare and contrast the collec-
tive effectiveness within the MPOs as they responded to the prospects of tapping 
into federal JARC funding.  The amount of collective effectiveness an MPO dem-
onstrates in achieving organizational goals arises out of organizational culture. 
This paper highlights how important institutional and grassroots support was 
for MPOs.  Analyzing how MPOs responded to the opportunity to develop JARC 
programs (and access the associated federal funding) not only provides insight 
into the culture of the MPOs, but into how effectively they integrated and acti-
vated different social institutions and social processes, leading to different policy 
outcomes.  The collective effectiveness within the MPO does not exist in isolation, 
but develops in response to the collective need.  Therefore, if the people in the 
region are excited about new alternative transit programs that address a specific 
need, then actors within the MPO will respond to the excitement and funnel this 
energy to formulate creative policy options.  Thus, the MPO will engage in collec-
tive action and do what is “best” for the region rather than simply what is best for 
the MPO (Douglas 1986).3  
This collective effectiveness can take many forms within the organization.  Thus, 
the conceptual advance presented in this paper is our framing of effectiveness 
within the institution and the effectiveness between grassroots organizations and 
institutions.  Institutional effectiveness and grassroots effectiveness are essential 
factors that augment trust among all actors, thereby increasing the capacity to 
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perform at higher and more creative levels (Altshuler and Behn 1997).  The end 
result will be the creation of social processes that will produce innovation in tran-
sit services for low-income families, which will be implemented for the greater 
good of the region. 
Institutional Support
The first conceptualization of effectiveness is institutional support.  Effectiveness 
will increase with increased levels of institutional support from the MPO, regional, 
state, and national-level politicians who placed JARC funding as a priority for the 
region.  This was particularly true as the game changed and the JARC funding 
process moved from being proposal-driven to one where nearly all the funds were 
earmarked.  If a region did not convince its Congressional delegation to put in for 
earmarks, its share of JARC funds dropped sharply.  Thus, any desire to creatively 
work with JARC declined.  Institutional support is extremely important in deter-
mining if the MPO feels that it can respond to the transportation needs of the 
poor in creative and more efficient ways with a sense of cooperation with alterna-
tive transportation providers.  If the MPO has no support, then it sees alternative 
transportation providers as competition, in the sense that transportation funding 
may ultimately be diverted from more general transportation problems that it 
feels are more central to its mission.  The end result is that there will be little col-
lective efficacy to change the culture of the MPO (DiMaggio and Powell 1991).  
In the case of JARC, institutional support at the federal level can be measured by 
the amount of earmarking activity on the part of the region that occurred in fiscal 
year 2003.  The impacts of institutional support (i.e., how well this support was 
translated into the internal processes of the MPO) can be measured in a variety 
of ways: (1) efficiency, (2) cooperation, (3) creativity, and (4) implementation. 
By efficiency, we are looking for institutions that decide to work outside of the 
normal bureaucratic structures to deliver JARC programs.  We are interested in 
cooperation because the early literature on bureaucracies indicates that they 
emerge because of competition (Weber [1922] 1978).  MPOs with little support 
will maintain ironclad policy choices, and they view the diversity of transporta-
tion options as threatening.  In contrast, MPOs with high institutional support 
will view the grassroots organizations as an asset to achieving policy goals that 
can be achieved within their organization with efficiency.  These MPOs will create 
processes that will cultivate a new discourse of creative policy options to meet 
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the unique demands of the poor.  Furthermore, these processes will foster a policy 
environment that will be conducive to policy implementation.
Grassroots Support
The second conceptualization of effectiveness is grassroots support.  Grassroots 
support is defined as non-profit and non-traditional transportation organizations. 
We believe that grassroots support represents a collective decision (by community 
members or organizations) that is not made in isolation, but rather in response to 
an opportunity to work in a changing environment (e.g., JARC) (Singh et al. 1991). 
One of the unique aspects of the JARC program was that it encouraged innovation 
and support from grassroots organizations.  The potential grassroots involvement 
in a region could be orderly or chaotic, depending on how many organizations 
actually submitted an application.  The view of grassroots organizations and MPOs 
has been viewed as a confrontational relationship, where the MPO has to continue 
its policy implementation in the face of conflict (Forester 1989).  However, JARC 
had the potential to change this confrontational relationship with grassroots 
organizations because the premise of JARC was to involve grassroots organiza-
tions from the very beginning, where these organizations would be co-designers 
and co-implementers of transportation policy.  The goal of the MPO was to coor-
dinate the grassroots activities for the collective good of the region and to create 
an environment that produced a partnership between the MPO and community 
organizations that was conducive to creative transportation policies and innova-
tive implementation strategies.  Grassroots involvement in the JARC process was 
generally straight-forward to measure because the number of non-profit and non-
traditional groups that pushed for JARC funding or that played an active role in 
the process were counted.
Research Design and Data
We developed an analytical typology of support that framed our research design 
and methodology.  The two dimensions were levels of institutional support and 
grassroots support.  At the beginning of our discussion, we felt it was important to 
study at least three regions so that we could observe variation in institutional and 
grassroots support.  We felt it appropriate that each region score highly in at least 
one dimension due to our concerns that a region that was low along both dimen-
sions might not pursue any JARC funding and would essentially be a null case for 
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our study.   After much deliberation, the Kansas City, Chicago, and San Francisco 
Bay metropolitan regions were selected based on initial archival research.  Prelimi-
nary archival research indicated that the three regions selected filled the appropri-
ate cells in our typology, so we undertook a more detailed analysis of each region. 
We believe that examining variations in institutional and grassroots support offers 
an important analytical lens to study innovation and the eventual implementa-
tion of JARC programs.  Figure 1 reflects the analytical typology, as well as the 
initial assessment of where the cases should be located.  This typology allowed us 
to frame our inquiry around the role that institutional and external support had 
in shaping JARC programs.
Grassroots Support
High Low
Institutional Support High San Francisco Kansas City
Low Chicago
 
Figure 1. Institutional and Grassroots Support for JARC Programs
 
Our first hypothesis was that the inertia of traditional bureaucratic transportation 
institutions would not foster inter- or intra-agency cooperation because of low-
institutional support regardless of grassroots support (Government Accounting 
Office 1999).  Our second hypothesis was that agencies with low institutional sup-
port would shy away from creative non-traditional transit programs (e.g., private 
mobility).  However, MPOs with high grassroots support would navigate to these 
programs because the grassroots organizations would be more efficient in service 
delivery.  Our final hypothesis was that agencies with high institutional support 
would favor devolution of authority or decision making.  By using these hypotheses 
as our guidelines, the analysis of JARC at the regional level represents an exemplary 
case to study how some institutions create new processes that hamper innovation 
and how other institutions create new processes that foster innovation.
Data Collection Strategy
We decided that the analysis of three regions would be framed around a case-
study design.  Data were collected in three distinct phases.  First, we attended local 
meetings where key stakeholders were present.  The meetings were sponsored 
by the MPO or the grassroots organizations.  This allowed us to observe who 
attended the meetings and who participated in the public discussions.  Second, we 
interviewed several individuals from the respective MPOs and grassroots organiza-
A Case Study of Job Access and Reverse Commute Programs
101
tions.  Most of the interviews were done face-to-face.  However, a few interviews 
were conducted by telephone because of logistical issues.  The interviews were not 
taped, but we took notes that highlighted the important themes that emerged 
from the interviews.  Finally, we collected published reports, newspaper articles, 
and public documents that were related to JARC programs in each region.  The 
documents were systematically organized to study innovation, implementation, 
grassroots support, and institutional support.  
The Chicago Case
The Chicago metropolitan area was well positioned to qualify for JARC funding 
when the program was announced.  Due to pressure from community groups, the 
Chicago Area Transportation Study (CATS), the MPO for the region, established 
the Community Mobility Task Force.  This task force was created to study the 
mobility needs of the poor, particularly access to job opportunities for the unem-
ployed.4 In 1998-99, the Task Force had 21 members, including the Illinois Depart-
ment of Transportation (IDOT), the Illinois Department of Human Services, the 
City of Chicago, the Councils of Mayors, the three public transit agencies, private 
transportation providers, social service agencies, and community based organiza-
tions (e.g., The Center for Neighborhood Technology [CNT]).
As the FTA worked on guidance, the Task Force continued to meet and consider 
early candidates for JARC funds, including an expansion of the Metra Shuttle Bug 
service and a bus service to take residents from the South suburbs to industrial 
jobs around O’Hare Airport (Chicago Area Transportation Study 1998).  In Octo-
ber, the FTA guidance for the program was released.  At that time, MPOs were 
informed that the applications for JARC funds were due by December 31, a very 
short lead time for such an important program, which was then cut further by 
two weeks due to the need to have the grant proposal ready for approval by the 
CATS Policy Committee (Chicago Area Transportation Study 1998).  In October, 
the Task Force hosted a workshop for non-traditional transportation providers 
to explain the program and to solicit proposals for JARC funding.  One general 
finding was that participation in the Task Force was erratic.  Many of the core 
task force members attended nearly all meetings, but smaller transit providers or 
average citizens appeared only when there was a chance that new projects would 
be selected for inclusion in an official CATS submittal.  Participation dropped off 
as it became clear that new projects would be shut out due to the high levels of 
federal earmarking.
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It became apparent to the Task Force that the local match requirement (a full 
50%) was an insurmountable barrier for the vast majority of the small transpor-
tation companies unless they had partnered with a government agency, such as 
the City of Chicago or DuPage County.  Of the 14 projects that were submitted, 
those projects not connected to a government agency were often grouped into 
a catchall project called the Chicago Area Job Access and Transit Enhancement 
Plan, which would be administered by the CTA, Metra, and Pace.  
After evaluating the proposals, the Task Force pulled together its grant proposal. 
The proposal included eight first-tier projects at a total cost of $2.5 million, with 
$1.5 programmed for the Chicago Area Job Access and Transit Enhancement 
Plan.  There were three second- and third-tier projects, which were requests for 
second year funding for several of the first-tier projects (Chicago Area Transporta-
tion Study 1998).  It appears that when the FTA analyzed the grant proposal, the 
agency ran down the list and accepted the first five-first tier projects for a total 
grant of $2.2 million and dropped the remainder, for the award amounts for FY 
1999 closely matched the CATS’ figures in the proposal.  
Northeastern Illinois continued to receive a considerable share of JARC funds for 
FY 2000 through FY 2002.  In all three years, the total grants were over $2 million. 
However, due to Congressional earmarking, CATS and the Community Mobility 
Task Force had less and less control over how the funds were allocated.  For exam-
ple, of the $2.2 million for FY 2000, CATS had only $1 million to distribute.  The 
funds to be spent on direct transportation services for the poor were cut roughly 
in half, though of course the region still had a considerable sum of unobligated 
funds from FY 1999.  The funding picture was similar for FY 2000, where roughly 
$2 million was available for the Chicago metropolitan region, but $1.5 million had 
come from various earmarks.  By FY 2002, nearly 90 percent of JARC funds were 
allocated according to earmarks, though the Chicago area still won some of the 
competitive grants, but by FY 2003, the entire federal JARC program had been 
earmarked.  Chicago’s share dropped to under $0.5 million (See Table 1).  When 
examined on a per capita basis, the Kansas City and San Francisco regions received 
nearly four times the JARC funding as Chicago, which can be attributed almost 
entirely to earmarks.  This is a curious outcome, given that, at both the central city 
level and regional level, Chicago’s poverty rate exceeds that of Kansas City or San 
Francisco.  
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Table 1. JARC Funding ($ millions) in Metropolitan Chicago,  
Kansas City and San Francisco
 
Note:  FY 2003-05 Chicago figures does not include statewide Illinois Ways to Work funding 
Source: CATS, MARC, MTC, US GAO, US Census
One CATS official responsible for oversight of the Community Mobility Task 
Force’s proposal commented that the heavy use of earmarks in the last years of the 
program made it a different program.  Most agencies nationwide that asked their 
Congressional representatives for JARC earmarks did receive them, but in the Chi-
cago region only PACE, UIC, and DuPage County made that effort.  This person did 
not speculate on why CTA and Metra did not seek out earmarks, though it could 
well be that those agencies were already asking Congress to fund massive infra-
structure projects that had a higher internal priority than the JARC programs.  
In giving a general evaluation of the program, one local observer from the Center 
for Neighborhood Technology felt that the JARC program was very important for 
simply trying to meet the transportation needs of the poor.  This person felt that 
there was considerable pent-up demand for non-traditional transit service specifi-
cally targeted at welfare recipients and other low-income individuals.  This person 
would have liked more flexibility in the program, particularly when it came to the 
FTA requirements, but a more critical need was to ensure that there was ongoing 
support for worthy JARC programs, since agencies generally were not willing to 
commit themselves to sustaining reverse commute programs in the absence of 
external funds.  The program should have been structured to guarantee the oper-
ating funds for a longer time in order to build demand for transit in the region; 
even a three-year pilot program was not really long enough.
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The San Francisco Case
The situation in the Bay Area was similar to that in Chicago in terms of the MPO 
applying for a large JARC grant to support a transit-oriented plan.  In addition, in 
both regions, a fair number of stakeholders took part in the process.  After the 
passage of California’s CalWORKs law in 1997, the Metropolitan Transportation 
Commission (MTC) took a leadership role to address the transportation barriers 
that poor women would encounter as they looked for work.  Because MTC is the 
transportation planning, coordinating, and financing agency for the San Francisco 
Bay region, they were in a unique position to lead the planning process and iden-
tify regional transit problems and solutions.  
In 1998, with the support of MTC, AC Transit started an experimental bus line 
that operated during evening hours to connect welfare recipients in Richmond 
to employment centers that had job openings for shift workers.  This was the first 
program enacted that specifically addressed a key transportation barrier for Cal-
WORK recipients.  The goal of the service was to provide more transit access to 
Richmond, which had one of the highest concentrations of CalWORK recipients, 
to areas that had a shortage of entry-level employees.  In the eyes of MTC and 
AC Transit, the “OWL” service was a success because it was providing a service to 
residents and the service was being used by the residents.  Success in this context 
is relative.  In fact, when asked to define success, the officials from MTC simply 
stated that the “OWL” service was a success because it was used by underserved 
low-income populations regardless of the cost.5
MTC coordinated all the JARC applications by grassroots organizations to ensure 
that there were no duplications in services.  One of the most innovative programs 
funded with JARC funds was the regional JARC program, the Low-Income Flexible 
Transportation program (LIFT).  LIFT provided funding to fill transportation gaps 
that had been identified through local and regional welfare-to-work planning 
workgroups with grassroots organizations. One major goal of LIFT was to secure 
JARC funding for grassroots organizations to ensure that these organizations had 
the opportunity to be co-planners, co-designers, and co-implementers of innova-
tive JARC programs. 
Taking advantage of JARC’s flexibility, in the first round, MTC funded two projects 
designed to provide transportation for children and one project designed to pro-
vide non-traditional transportation access.  One reason there was a low number 
of these projects was that they required more time and coordination from MTC 
staff.  Another reason there was a low number of applications was because it took 
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a significant amount of time to clarify JARC program objectives and regulations 
and identify resources that could be used to ensure that the program would 
work.  Even though half of the LIFT programs were for bus line improvements, 
MTC recognized that public transit could not meet the needs of all CalWORK 
recipients (Fol et al. 2007).  This was a new and awkward position for MTC given 
that their overall mission is to promote public transit (Fol et al. 2007; Blumenberg 
et al. 2003).  By funding two car programs and one vanpool program in the sec-
ond round of LIFT funding, MTC took a step towards increasing the diversity of 
transit options for low-income populations.  Studies have consistently shown that 
welfare recipients that own a car are more likely to leave the welfare rolls and find 
sustainable employment (Lucas and Nicholson 2003; Cervero et al. 2002; O'Regan 
and Quigley 1998; Blumenberg 2000; Cervero et al. 2002; Ong and Blumenberg 
1998; Ong 1996; Raphael and Rice 2002).  Another study found that even those 
welfare recipients who found employment using public transportation would 
immediately buy a car when they have saved enough money for the down pay-
ment (Blumenberg 2000).6
More significantly, MTC increased funding for transportation services specifically 
targeted at children of low-income families.  These types of services have become 
increasingly important as single women with children try to reduce the number of 
multi-leg work commutes to simple one-leg commutes, thus reducing the amount 
of time they have to spend on commuting and transferring from bus line to bus 
line to get from their home to work.  Perhaps one of the most innovative uses of 
LIFT funding was a program in Sonoma County called Long-Term Transportation 
Solutions.  One component of this program was teaching welfare recipients how 
to make complex trips via public transit more efficient.  Many entry-level job 
openings for Sonoma County residents are located in San Rafael in Marin County. 
Getting to these jobs via public transit is possible, but bad trip planning can result 
in a passenger spending unnecessary hours on public transit.  Learning how to read 
a transit system and plan appropriately for bus transfers is essential for residents in 
the North Bay, where bus service is not as frequent as service in the East Bay.
The Kansas City Case
The MPO for the Kansas City area is the Mid-America Regional Council (MARC). 
In contrast to Chicago, the initial response from established transit agencies in 
Kansas City when the opportunity for JARC funding arose was to compete against 
each other for funding.  The JARC funding regulations had specified a single fund-
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ing application come from each region, so the transit agencies still had to work 
through the MPO rather than to submit separate applications to FTA directly. 
This presented MARC with a choice of submitting a laundry list of six or seven 
unrelated projects or trying to present a unified plan that might be more compel-
ling to FTA.  MARC attempted the latter approach and, within a month, pulled 
together a consortium of area transportation providers, municipalities, and social 
service organizations to create the Kansas City Areawide Job Access Partnership, 
which became an advisory council under MARC’s committee structure.  Many of 
the participants already were members of the Special Transportation committee, 
which addressed the transportation needs of the elderly and disabled populations 
in the Kansas City metropolitan area (Special Transportation Advisory Committee 
1992).  The original members were MARC, the Kansas City Area Transit Authority 
(KCATA) (Missouri), Unified Government Transit (UGT) (Kansas City, Kansas and 
Wyandotte County), Johnson County Transit, Full Employment Council, OATS (a 
rural transportation provider), and Ray County Transit.  
In developing the consolidated, multi-year JARC application, MARC officials and 
committee participants reported that there were already-known transportation 
needs that were not being addressed and special challenges facing the Kansas 
City region, if it wished to compete for JARC funding.  Despite four transit service 
providers in the region (KCATA, Johnson County Transit, Ray County Transit, and 
OATS), there was no dedicated revenue source to fund transit.  In addition to 
making it much harder to develop a funding stream for the local match provision 
in the JARC application, the participants were concerned about the possibility of 
implementing services that would then be lost after the federal funding was gone. 
Thus, there were efforts early on to enlist employer-support for JARC services in an 
attempt to make the new services self-sustaining.  
Metropolitan Kansas City benefitted substantially from the earmarking process.  A 
Kansas congressman liberally earmarked JARC funds for his region.  During the five 
years of the TEA-21-legislated JARC program, he acquired $2,000,000 for the Job 
Access Partnership to support job access transportation in Johnson County and 
$4,625,000 for the Unified Government.  He also secured an earmark of $500,000 
for UG in the reauthorized transportation bill SAFETEA-LU (Mid-America 
Regional Council 2005). 
An official from Unified Government Transit reported that the earmarked funding 
was used to offset the cost of its annual contract with KCATA for transit service. 
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KCATA provides 850,000 passenger trips in Wyandotte County plus transporta-
tion between Kansas and Missouri.  UGT also participates in the JARC Partnership 
because of its regional focus, for which it receives $45,000 annually.  Through 2004, 
these funds were used for UGT’s Joblinks program, which was contracted service 
to provide transportation to Wyandotte County residents who worked in Johnson 
County, at locations that either had no bus service or no service during the rider’s 
work shift.  About 33,000 annual trips were provided with this service.  Recently, 
the transit service subsidized with JARC funding was shifted to serve an area of 
Wyandotte County that has a NASCAR track and an adjacent 400 acres that the 
County has retained for future development.  Over 2,500 job opportunities are 
anticipated in the area. 
Discussion
In Chicago, implementing the various JARC projects turned out to be considerably 
more challenging than winning the awards.  It turned out that few (if any) FTA 
regulations had been reduced or relaxed for non-traditional providers involved 
in the projects.  This ultimately led to the Regional Transportation Authority act-
ing in an oversight capacity to ensure that all FTA requirements would be met to 
prevent violations that might result in lost funding.  Since this relationship had not 
been completely worked out prior to the submittal of the JARC grant application, 
it took time to set it up.  Staff turnover at RTA also hampered the implementa-
tion of the program.  While some JARC funds were expanded in 2000, it was clear 
that the program was severely delayed, above and beyond the nine month lag that 
most projects faced.  The U.S. DOT noted that by mid 2001, only seven projects 
had been selected for grants in FY 1999 where the funds had still not been fully 
obligated, and five of them were in the Chicago area—essentially the entire CATS 
proposal (Chicago Area Transportation Study 1998).  
Chicago was objectively slower in using JARC funds than other metropolitan 
regions, which might have led to the frustration some grassroots organizations 
had with the program.  The meeting minutes from the Community Mobility 
Task Force often present grassroots organizations attempting to hold transit 
agencies responsible for previous JARC obligations.  In some cases, pressure from 
these grassroots organizations appeared to keep a few JARC programs running 
longer.  Nonetheless, the relationship between the transportation planners and 
the grassroots organizations was somewhat strained over the JARC process, and a 
certain amount of defensive blame-avoidance was observed.  From our research, 
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it appears that devoting more effort to maintain and improve these relationships 
would have not produced more institutional support for innovative JARC proj-
ects.  
Table 1 indicated that Chicago had the lowest institutional support (at the federal 
level) of the three MPOs studied.  Earmarks were not a high priority for Chicago’s 
Congressional representation, and JARC funding went to other regions with 
smaller impoverished populations (in absolute and relative terms).  The imple-
mentation of JARC-funded projects went the most smoothly when run through 
transit service boards (i.e., between official agencies) and the grassroots efforts 
stalled.  Metra, Pace, and the CTA all were able to report new JARC-supported 
service on the ground by December 2000. 
The lessons learned in Chicago appear to be that non-traditional companies were 
not well positioned to administer JARC programs on their own or even with the 
assistance of the RTA.  Successful partnerships were possible where a smaller com-
pany partnered with CTA, Metra, or Pace.7 One potential solution of the Access-
to-Jobs program would have been for the FTA to undergo a cultural change, mak-
ing them more willing to accept nontraditional approaches for addressing welfare-
to-work barriers (Government Accounting Office 1998).  Many observers contend 
that this cultural shift did not occur and made implementing the program more 
difficult.  Additional institutional support presumably would have allowed RTA to 
overcome these barriers (as MTC was able to do).  In short, MTC was more active 
than CATS in actively pursuing inter-agency collaboration with grassroots orga-
nization.  The synergy of inter-agency collaboration gave MTC more institutional 
support to use JARC funding in a more creative way.  
In contrast to Chicago, both the San Francisco Bay Area and Kansas City received 
large earmarks, indicating considerable institutional support.  The respective MPOs 
had quite different outcomes in terms of success in engaging the grassroots.  First, 
as MTC worked with grassroots organizations, three objectives were identified to 
address the transportation barriers:  (1) “assess the transportation requirements 
of CalWORKs program participants and identify transportation-related barriers 
to obtaining and retaining work,” (2) “identify strategies to increase availability, 
affordability, and effectiveness of transportation services,” and (3) “establish 
agreements among the transportation providers, employers and Social Services 
Agency (SSA) to ensure the availability of Transportation options” (Stewart 1999). 
As mentioned previously, MTC recognized that traditional public transit services 
could not solve all the transportation needs for welfare recipients.  MTC was the 
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only region that worked aggressively with grassroots organizations to sponsor sev-
eral non-traditional transportation projects with JARC funds (e.g., car programs 
and vanpool programs).  The strong grassroots support allowed MTC to create 
innovative, non-traditional transportation programs to meet the unorthodox 
transportation needs of welfare-to-work recipients.
It is important to note that although MTC considered the LIFT program to be a 
success, it expressed concern about institutional and programmatic barriers that 
interfered with the coordination of welfare-to-work and job access programs. 
MTC consistently encountered programmatic barriers, a lack of flexibility in JARC 
guidelines, and a failure by FTA to answer questions regarding JARC guidelines in 
an appropriate time-frame.  As far as the institutional barriers were concerned, 
MTC found that it was difficult to maintain momentum with welfare-to-work 
plans.  MTC applauded JARC’s focus on coordination but found it difficult to coor-
dinate JARC activities with a diverse group of grassroots organizations providing 
services for CalWORK recipients.  Trying to coordinate with a diverse group was 
time-consuming, and it was difficult to build consensus, given that the organiza-
tions have different goals.  Despite these challenges, MTC and the grassroots orga-
nizations worked to create innovative programs that could be implemented.
In the Kansas City region, grassroots support was missing.  In the first round of 
JARC funding, no grassroots organizations were reported to have requested JARC 
funding.  In fact, there was no RFP process in the Kansas City region to invite 
groups that did not have a seat on the committee to participate in the JARC 
program until Year 4, for which the Partnership set aside 20 percent of the JARC 
funds for new projects.  The co-chair of the Special Transportation Committee 
reported that by the second application (second two-year program), the Partner-
ship knew where to beef up existing services because of the variety of interests on 
the committee.  By this time, the committee had more consumer representation, 
and the JARC Partnership and the committee that previously focused on senior 
citizens and the disabled population merged into a single Special Transit Com-
mittee, greatly expanding the number of participants.  The MPO and all but one 
member of the committee could list no grassroots organizations that pushed for 
JARC funding.  Much of the transportation advocacy work in the area has been in 
reference to encouraging legislators to create a stable funding source for transit or 
advocating for light rail.  Such organizations include the Regional Transit Alliance 
and Citizens for Modern Transit.  In contrast to the situations in Chicago and San 
Francisco, community groups in Kansas City did not play an active role in putting 
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the proposal together nor watching over how the funds were spent.  In general, 
community groups did not take an active role in following or trying to influence 
planning decisions taken by MARC.  
One group did try to fill the role of a grassroots organization, the Local Investment 
Commission (LINC), a community collaborative that works to improve the lives of 
children and families in Jackson County.  It is important to note that LINC worked 
with community-based agencies that were seeking JARC funds, served in an advi-
sory role to the committee, and provided matching funds for community groups, 
whose projects had been implemented.  LINC also worked with Ford and com-
munity programs to help low-income workers obtain loans for autos.  Based on 
the Kansas City case, we modified our first hypothesis to indicate that institutional 
support is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for innovation.  The MPO had 
considerable support on the JARC issue and should have been able to work with 
any partner, but it was not met with any offers to establish non-traditional transit 
service.   As illustrated in Figure 1, San Francisco was the only region that had high 
institutional and high grassroots support.  Chicago had high grassroots support 
but insufficient institutional support.  Kansas City had high institutional support 
but lacked grassroots support.
Conclusions
We framed this paper around two issues: (1) institutional support and (2) grass-
roots support.   Our analysis shows the Chicago, Kansas City, and San Francisco 
MPOs responded in different ways.  We believe that the policy outcomes reflected 
the intensity of institutional and grassroots support to use JARC as an opportu-
nity to create innovative transportation programs for low-income populations. 
In regards to our analytical typology of support, MTC was the only region with 
high institutional and grassroots support; thus, it was in a unique position to 
actively pursue private mobility programs for low-income families.  Although 
these programs were discussed for the Chicago region, CATS did not provide the 
type of institutional support that MTC provided.  Although the Kansas region had 
the institutional support for such creativity, it lacked the grassroots support for 
private mobility programs.  In fact, MTC’s support for these car-sharing programs 
showed that they recognized that the structural barriers could not be overcome 
by fixed transit service.  By recognizing that public transit was simply not flexible 
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enough to meet all the needs of CalWORK recipients, MTC opened an important 
avenue of private mobility services that, in the long-run, foster a policy environ-
ment that is conducive to sustainable economic self-sufficiency.  MTC’s vision 
reflects the new collective rationality that investing in private mobility programs 
is a greater good than continually investing in public transit programs where there 
is no long-term bang for the buck.
Finally, alone among the MPOs we studied, MTC spearheaded an effort to create 
a regional JARC program to allow smaller non-traditional transportation providers 
to apply for federal money.  MTC created social processes in which some author-
ity and project management was given to grassroots organizations.  Thinking 
more broadly about creativity, institutional creativity often requires sufficient 
funding (that has not been narrowly restricted to particular uses), and in the 
later fiscal years of the JARC program, the rules had changed to the point where 
substantial funding was only available when there was high institutional support 
from national-level politicians.  While the institutional support appears to be a 
necessary condition, it is not sufficient, or more innovation would have occurred 
in Kansas City.  The combination of institutional and grassroots support was what 
allowed MTC to be the most innovative region.
End Notes
1 Policy experts warned that transportation was not a panacea to lower welfare 
rates.  Other needs, such as access to child care or basic skill training, are just as 
crucial for welfare recipients as they try to find jobs (see Wachs and Taylor 1998). 
2 See Douglas (1986) for an expanded discussion of rational choice theory and 
functional theory.
3 Bureaucratic agencies (or rather, the bureaucrats staffing them) are often moti-
vated more by blame-avoidance than the more positive (and potentially construc-
tive) credit-seeking role that can be activated by public support for new policies 
and programs (Lee 1994).  Indeed, it is worth considering whether innovation in 
itself is likely to provoke blame-avoidance as a preemptive strategy and what may 
be done to limit this response.
4 The process of instituting the Community Mobility Task Force began in June 
1997, but it took several months to determine its composition.  The Task Force is 
unique among CATS’ working groups, since it is the only one to be chaired (in fact, 
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co-chaired) by citizen representatives rather than a representative of the govern-
ment or a transportation provider.  This structure was requested by a variety of 
community and environmental groups in Chicago.
5 Scholars have found that the 376 line cost $7 per passenger trip versus a fare of 
$1.50 (Sööt et al. 2002). 
6 Reverse commute programs that are measured on ridership (rather than people 
removed from welfare rolls) will inevitably spend more resources chasing potential 
riders as the original riders opt out of the service after a few months of employ-
ment when they are able to buy a car (Petersen and Sermons 1996).
7 The DuPage Federation, which had earmarks in all years after FY 1999, did work 
with smaller companies.
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